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REGULATORY OBSTACLES TO HARM
REDUCTION: THE CASE OF SMOKING
Jonathan H. Adler*
INTRODUCTION
Cigarette use remains the leading cause of avoidable death in the
United States. 1 Smoking rates have declined over the past several

* Johan

Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law
and Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. This article was
prepared for the symposium on “Medical Innovation and the Law,” sponsored by the
Classical Liberal Institute at the NYU School of Law, February 22, 2017. The author
would like to thank Alex Lilly for her research assistance. Any errors, omissions, or
inanities that remain are solely the fault of the author.
1 See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING—50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2014),
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/50th-anniversary/index.htm; see
also Goodarz Danaei et al., The Preventable Causes of Death in the United States:
Comparative Risk Assessment of Dietary, Lifestyle, and Metabolic Risk Factors, 6 PLOS MED.
e100058 (2009) (identifying smoking as leading cause of preventable death). Smoking
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decades, but millions of Americans continue to smoke.2 Many find it
difficult to quit, whether due to nicotine addiction or a dependence
upon smoking as a behavioral habit.3
The inability of many smokers to quit is a significant public
health problem. The demand for a product that can help smokers
kick the habit is an entrepreneurial opportunity. In surveys, a
majority of smokers express concern for their health and a desire to
kick the habit.4 Product innovations that help smokers quit, whether
by satisfying nicotine addiction in a less harmful manner or by
helping wean smokers from current habits, could reduce the death
toll of tobacco and prove profitable for innovative firms. In the case
of tobacco harm reduction, entrepreneurs have the opportunity to do
well by doing good. Yet, as in many areas, government regulation
threatens to hamper welfare-enhancing innovation and discourage
the use of life-saving technologies.
Electronic cigarettes (“e-cigarettes” or “e-cigs”) appear to be the
most promising smoking alternative to enter the market to date. E-

may be responsible for up to one-quarter of mortalities for those between 35 and 69
years old in the 1980s. See Prabhat Jha et al., 21st-Century Hazards of Smoking and Benefits
of Cessation in the United States, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 341, 342 (2013).
2 See Ahmed Jamal et al., Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2005–2015, 65
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1205, 1205 (2016) (estimating 36.5 million
Americans smoked in 2015); see also Michael C. Fiore, Steven A. Schroeder & Timothy
B. Baker, Smoke, the Chief Killer—Strategies for Targeting Combustible Tobacco Use, 370
NEW ENG. J. MED. 297, 297 (2014) (noting precipitous drop in smoking rates between
1965 and 2012).
3 See Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., Prepared Remarks, Protecting
American Families: Comprehensive Approach to Nicotine and Tobacco, (July 28,
2017), at https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm569024.htm. (“[T]oo
many people who are addicted to cigarettes today and want to quit are unable to do
so”).
4 See Frank Newport, Most U.S. Smokers Want to Quit, Have Tried Multiple Times,
GALLUP (July 31, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163763/smokers-quit-triedmultiple-times.aspx.
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cigarettes have the potential to satisfy smokers’ craving for nicotine
in a less dangerous way. 5 The available evidence suggests ecigarettes expose smokers (and others) to a fraction of the health risks
posed by combustible tobacco. 6 For this reason, the use and
promotion of e-cigarettes is a potential harm reduction strategy for
smoking. 7 Yet the harm reduction potential of e-cigarettes is
hampered by federal regulation and the not-so-subtle suggestion
from government officials that e-cigarettes are as dangerous as
tobacco cigarettes.8 However well-intentioned, regulatory measures
adopted by the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) may come at the
expense of public health.
This Article discusses how FDA regulation of e-cigarettes and
other alternatives to traditional tobacco products inhibits their lifesaving potential. Part I provides a brief overview of federal tobacco

See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
See A. MCNEILL ET AL., PUB. HEALTH ENG., PHE PUB. GATEWAY NO. 2015260 ECIGARETTES: AN EVIDENCE UPDATE 76 (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government
/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/457102/Ecigarettes_an_evidence_
update_A_report_commissioned_by_Public_Health_England_FINAL.pdf
(“An
expert review of the latest evidence concludes that e-cigarettes are around 95% safer
than smoked tobacco and they can help smokers to quit.”). See also Fiore et al., supra
note 2, at 297-98 (“[U]p to 98% of tobacco-related deaths are attributable to
combustible products . . . .”).
7 See Zachary Cahn & Michael Siegel, Electronic Cigarettes as a Harm Reduction Strategy
for Tobacco Control: A Step Forward or a Repeat of Past Mistakes?, 32 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y
16 (2011) (“Harm reduction is a framework for public health policy that focuses on
reducing the harmful consequences of recreational drug use without necessarily
reducing or eliminating the use itself.”). For an early example of tobacco harm
reduction advocacy, see Brad Rodu, Editorial: An Alternative Approach to Smoking
Control, 308 AMER. J. MED. SCI. 32 (1994).
8 As one tobacco-control advocate commented, “[T]he unintended consequence is
more lives are going to be lost.” See Sabrina Tavernise, Safer to Puff, E-Cigarettes Can’t
Shake Their Reputation as a Menace, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/11/02/health/e-cigarette-vape-njoy-bankruptcy.html (quoting
David Abrams of the Truth Initiative).
5
6
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regulation. Part II discusses electronic cigarettes, their use, and
potential health effects. Part III details the FDA’s so-called “deeming
rule,” through which the FDA has asserted regulatory authority over
electronic cigarettes and other “vaping” products. Part IV details
how FDA restrictions on truthful health information and
comparative risk claims further inhibits potentially life-saving
innovation by threatening to keep smokers and other consumers in
the dark about the harm-reducing potential of e-cigarettes. The
article then concludes with broader comments on the risk tradeoffs
inherent in technological innovation.
I.

FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS

For most of the Twentieth Century, the tobacco industry was
largely unregulated.9 After publication of the Surgeon General’s 1964
report on the harms of cigarette smoking, 10 the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) sought to require dramatic warning labels on
cigarette packages. 11 Congress responded by mandating milder
warnings, preempting state-level efforts to require more explicit

See generally Peter D. Jacobson et al., Historical Overview of Tobacco Legislation and
Regulation, 53 J. SOC. ISSUES 75 (1997). For a useful history of tobacco regulation and
litigation, see also Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: Regulating
Tobacco By Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225 (2008); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO
ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE
UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS (1997). Until the 1990s, it was generally
recognized that the FDA lacked authority over tobacco products under the Food, Drug
& Cosmetic Act. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143-55
(2000).
10 See DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH:
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE (1964).
11 Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health
Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (July 29, 1965) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt.
408).
9
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warnings.12 A few years later—also in response to more aggressive
agency initiatives—Congress prohibited cigarette and cigar
advertising on television.13
Meaningful federal regulation of tobacco products would not
emerge until after plaintiffs’ lawyers and state attorneys general were
able to impose substantial losses on the major cigarette
manufacturers through tort litigation and the imposition of the
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).14 The MSA required cigarette
manufacturers to pay substantial sums to participating states and
abide by various restrictions on advertising and promotion. As
structured, the agreement also helped protect incumbent producers
from potential competition.15
In 1996, the Food & Drug Administration sought to regulate
cigarettes and other tobacco products under the Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).16 According to the FDA, nicotine constituted

See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5(a), 79 Stat.
283 (1965). The preemption is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2017). For a discussion of
these developments, see Yandle et al., supra note 9, at 1249-51; see also Cipollone v.
Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 513-15 (1992).
13 See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-38); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2017). As Jack
Calfee discusses, major cigarette companies often stood to benefit from the anticompetitive effects of advertising restrictions. See John E. Calfee, The Ghost of Cigarette
Advertising Past, 10 REG. 35 (1986); see also John E. Calfee, Cigarette Advertising, Health
Information and Regulation Before 1970 (Fed. Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. 134,
1985).
14 See Yandle et al., supra note 9, at 1270-71.
15 Id. See also Michael Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 MO. L. REV.
285, 353 (2003) (“In order to protect the original participating manufacturers against
new market entrants, the MSA provides non-participating manufacturers with an
incentive to join the MSA without incurring proportionate payment obligations—
provided, however, that those small manufacturers agree to stabilize their sales at preMSA levels.”).
16 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,418 (1996).
12
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a “drug” and cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products should be
considered “drug delivery devices” under the Act. 17 On this basis,
the FDA asserted regulatory jurisdiction over tobacco products and
sought to regulate tobacco advertising and promotion. Although the
FDA’s rules focused on advertising and promotion directed at
children, treating cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as drug-delivery
devices created the opportunity for broader regulation of tobacco
products, if not their eventual prohibition.
The FDA’s initial effort to regulate cigarettes would not last long.
The major tobacco companies challenged the FDA’s authority to
regulate tobacco products under the FDCA and ultimately prevailed
in the Supreme Court.18 Despite the seemingly plain language of the
Act, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had not delegated
the FDA authority to regulate tobacco. 19 The history of federal
legislation concerning tobacco made clear that Congress had no
intention to subject cigarettes and other tobacco products to FDA
regulation, let alone to create the potential for the FDA to prohibit
tobacco products because cigarettes could not be deemed “safe and
effective” when used as intended.20
The major cigarette producers opposed the FDA’s effort to
regulate tobacco products under the FDCA. After the MSA, however,
they concluded federal tobacco regulation might be acceptable after
all—and potentially even beneficial. The nation’s largest cigarette
producer, Altria (aka Philip Morris), encouraged the adoption of

Id. at 44,397, 44,402.
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
19 Id. at 126 (“Congress has clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products.”).
20 Id. (“Such authority is inconsistent with the intent that Congress has expressed in
the FDCA's overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific legislation that it has
enacted subsequent to the FDCA.”).
17
18
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federal legislation that would give the FDA carefully-tailored
authority over cigarettes and other tobacco products. 21 Altria
concluded that a new federal law could insulate the industry from
future waves of tort litigation while simultaneously limiting
competition within the industry. 22 Accordingly, Altria worked with
anti-smoking organizations to craft federal legislation it could “live
with” as the dominant player in the tobacco industry.23
The result of these efforts was the Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (“Tobacco Act”),24 which gave the
FDA formal authority to regulate cigarettes and other tobacco
products, including those “made or derived from” tobacco. 25 By its
terms, the Tobacco Act imposes regulatory restrictions on cigarettes,
cigarette tobacco, roll-your-own tobacco, and smokeless tobacco.26 It
also provided the FDA with the authority to reach other tobacco
products, including pipes and cigars and at least some smoking

See P.A. McDaniel & R.E. Malone, Understanding Philip Morris’s Pursuit of US
Government Regulation of Tobacco, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 193 (2005), http://tobacco
control.bmj.com/content/14/3/193.full.
22 See Samuel Lowenberg, Smoke Screen: Why Is Philip Morris Supporting FDA Regulation
of Cigarettes?, SLATE (July 25, 2002), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/money
box/2002/07/smoke_screen.html.
23 See Duff Wilson, Philip Morris’s Support Casts Shadow Over a Bill to Limit Tobacco, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/01/business/01tobacco
.html (calling the resulting law “the tobacco regulation that Philip Morris can live
with.”).
24 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123
Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, and 21 U.S.C.).
25 For an overview of the Tobacco Act, see C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & VANESSA K.
BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40475, FDA TOBACCO REGULATION: THE FAMILY
SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT OF 2009 (2009).
26 See 21 U.S.C. § 387a(b) (2012).
21
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alternatives that compete with tobacco but that could not be
regulated under other existing authorities. 27
The Tobacco Act created a new division within the FDA, the
Center for Tobacco Products, which is authorized to develop and
impose tobacco regulations and is financed by fees imposed on
tobacco companies.28 The Tobacco Act requires tobacco companies to
disclose their product contents 29 and authorizes the FDA to set
tobacco product standards. 30 The Act further provides for more
explicit warning labels on tobacco products, 31 imposes stringent
limits on tobacco product advertising and promotion, 32 and limits
the use of flavoring in cigarettes.33 It also adopts additional controls
to prevent tobacco sales to minors.34
Significantly for product development and innovation, the Act
requires manufacturers to obtain premarket approval for new
tobacco products.35 This requirement does not apply to all products,
however. Those products that have been on the market for more than
a decade are exempt from the premarket approval requirement.
Specifically, the Act grandfathers those products marketed prior to
February 15, 2007.36 The Act also imposes additional restrictions on

See, e.g., Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the FDA
may not regulate e-cigarettes under the FDCA absent therapeutic claims by
manufacturers).
28 See 21 U.S.C. § 387a(e).
29 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 387d, 387i.
30 See 21 U.S.C. § 387g.
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 1333.
32 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 387f, 387k(g).
33 See 21 U.S.C. § 387g (a)(1).
34 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 387f(d)(3).
35 See 21 U.S.C. § 387j.
36 Id. The FDA has indicated that even relatively modest changes in product design or
packaging will be sufficient to identify a product as a new tobacco product, and not
substantially equivalent to a product already on the market. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
27
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“modified risk tobacco products” 37 and authorizes the FDA to
“deem” other “tobacco products” to be subject to the Act’s regulatory
requirements.38 In May 2016, the FDA used this authority to “deem”
electronic cigarettes to be tobacco products subject to federal
regulation.39
II. ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES
A. THE INDUSTRY
E-cigarettes are a relatively new competitor to cigarettes and
conventional tobacco products. First developed in China, e-cigarettes
have been marketed in the United States since 2006.40 Also known as

GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: DEMONSTRATING THE SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE OF A NEW
TOBACCO PRODUCT: RESPONSES TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (3d ed. Dec. 2016),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulato
ryInformation/UCM436468.pdf.
37 See 21 U.S.C. § 387k.
38 Specifically, 21 U.S.C. §387a(b) provides,
This subchapter shall apply to all cigarettes, cigarette tobacco, roll-yourown tobacco, and smokeless tobacco and to any other tobacco products that
the Secretary by regulation deems to be subject to this subchapter.
The Act defines a “tobacco product” as
any product made or derived from tobacco that is intended for human
consumption, including any component, part, or accessory of a tobacco
product (except for raw materials other than tobacco used in manufacturing
a component, part, or accessory of a tobacco product). 21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)(1).
39 Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Restrictions on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning
Statements for Tobacco Products; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,974 (May 10, 2016) [hereinafter “Final Deeming Rule”].
40 See Peter Hajek et al., Electronic Cigarettes: Review of Use, Content, Safety, Effects on
Smokers and Potential for Harm and Benefit, 109 ADDICTION 1801 (2014), http://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/add.12659/full; Barbara Demick, A High Tech
Approach to Getting a Nicotine Fix, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2009), http://articles.
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“electronic nicotine delivery systems” (ENDS), e-cigarettes typically
consist of a battery-powered atomizer, electronic components, and a
cartridge that holds a liquid solution.41 E-cigarettes come in a variety
of forms, including “cigalikes”—which have the shape and
appearance of traditional cigarettes and are available in both
disposable and rechargeable models—and various forms of modular
vaping devices, known as vapors, tanks, and mods (VTMs) that come
in a range of shapes and sizes and are refillable.42
Despite the label, e-cigarettes are not really cigarettes at all: they
do not contain tobacco and their use does not involve combustion or
the inhalation of smoke. 43 Instead, e-cigarettes heat and vaporize a
propylene-glycol or glycerol solution that typically contains nicotine
and some sort of flavoring. 44 Users inhale the vapor as a cigarette

latimes.com/2009/apr/25/world/fg-china-cigarettes25. Although not developed for
retail sale until the 21st century, early patents for smokeless delivery of nicotine were
filed as early as 1965. See Jordan Paradise, No Sisyphean Task: How the FDA Can Regulate
Electronic Cigarettes, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 326, 352-53 (2013).
41 See Riccardo Polosa et al., A Fresh Look at Tobacco Harm Reduction: The Case for the
Electronic Cigarette, 10 HARM REDUCTION J. 19, 22 (2013); Chitra Dinakar & George T.
O’Connor, The Health Effects of Electronic Cigarettes, 375 NEW ENGL. J. MED.. 1372, 137273 (2016).
42 The two types of e-cigarette devices are also characterized as “closed system” and
“open system,” respectively. See Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, No. CV 16-0878 (ABJ),
2017 WL 3130312, at *11 (D.D.C. July 21, 2017).
43 See Zachary Cahn & Michael Siegel, Electronic Cigarettes as a Harm Reduction Strategy
for Tobacco Control: A Step Forward or a Repeat of Past Mistakes?, 32 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y
16, 17 (2011); Dinakar & O’Connor, supra note 41, at 1372 (noting use of e-cigarettes “is
fundamentally different from the combustion of tobacco, and consequently the
composition of the aerosol from e-cigarettes and the smoke from tobacco is quite
different.”).
44 See Polosa, et al., supra note 41, at 22; Dinakar & O’Connor, supra note 41, at 1374;
Caroline Franck et al., Ethical Considerations of E-cigarette Use for Tobacco Harm
Reduction, 17 RESPIRATORY RES. 53, 54-55 (2016). While most e-cigarette fluids contain
nicotine, nicotine-free fluids are also available.
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user might inhale smoke. For this reason, e-cigarette use is referred
to as “vaping.”
E-cigarettes have proven to be a disruptive technology,
threatening the market for traditional tobacco products. 45 Initially
manufactured and distributed by small firms, e-cigarettes are now
made and sold by a range of firms, including the major tobacco
companies. 46 By 2015, the market for e-cigarettes and related
accessories topped $3 billion in the U.S., $8 billion worldwide.47 Most
e-cigarette users appear to be current or former smokers. 48 Ecigarettes are an alternative way for smokers (and others) to consume
nicotine at lower risk and (in many jurisdictions) lower cost. 49 Unlike
other smoking cessation devices, such as most FDA-approved
Nicotine Replacement Therapies (NRTs), e-cigarettes mimic the act

See generally David B. Abrams, Promise and Peril of E-Cigarettes: Can Disruptive
Technology Make Cigarettes Obsolete, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 135 (2014).
46 A 2014 study reported there were over 450 brands of e-cigarettes. See Shu-Hong Zhu,
et al., Four Hundred and Sixty Brands of E-cigarettes and Counting: Implications for Product
Regulation, 23 TOBACCO CONTROL iii3 (2014); see also Dinakar & O’Connor, supra note
41, at 1372 (citing estimate of 466 e-cigarette brands and 7764 “unique flavors of ecigarette products”).
47 See Jilian Mincer, The U.S. Vaporizer Market is Booming, BUS. INSIDER (July 29, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-in-rise-of-us-vape-shops-owners-eye-newmarijuana-market-2015-7 (estimating $35 billion electronic cigarette market in U.S.);
Diane Caruana, E-cigarette Market estimated at USD 44.56 Billion by 2024, VAPING POST
(Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.vapingpost.com/2017/08/09/e-cigarette-marketestimated-at-usd-44-56-billion-by-2024/ (noting estimate of $8 billion global market in
2015).
48 See Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 29,036 (“[M]ost ENDS are consumed by
smokers and former smokers . . . .”); see also K.E. Farsalinos et al., Characteristics,
Perceived Side-Effects and Benefits of Electronic Cigarette Use: A Worldwide Survey of More
than 19,000 Consumers, 11 INTL J. ENVTL RES. & PUB. HEALTH 4356, 4356 (2014).
49 See Jonathan H. Adler et al., Baptists, Bootleggers, & Electronic Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. ON
REG. 313, 335, 357 (2016).
45
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of smoking, potentially satisfying “both pharmacologic and
behavioral components of cigarette addiction.” 50
Over the past decade, the e-cigarette industry developed and
evolved rapidly. Low barriers to entry ensured a highly competitive
market. The lack of regulation has meant e-cigarette and vaping fluid
producers have not needed to seek government approval before
marketing or selling new product designs or flavorings. Producers
have been free to experiment and innovate in an effort to discover
what product designs, features, or characteristics will most satisfy
consumer demand. As a consequence, the e-cigarettes on the market
today are quite different than those sold five or ten years ago.
The industry itself is marked by a range of participants, from
small retailers that sell imported products from China to larger firms,
including some tobacco companies. To date, no single firm has been
able to maintain a dominant market position. 51 Each year from 2012
through 2015 saw a different brand emerge as the market leader
among “cigalike” e-cigarettes.52 Over this same period, the demand
for customizable VTM or “open-system” products also increased.53
Traditional cigarette companies have invested heavily in this market,
acquiring competing firms and taking advantage of their distribution

See Cahn & Siegel, supra note 43, at 17.
See Adler et. al, supra note 49, at 337.
52 See Id. at 337. In 2016, NJoy, “once one of the country’s biggest e-cigarette
manufacturers” declared bankruptcy. Sabrina Tavernise, Safer to Puff, E-Cigarettes
Can’t Shake Their Reputation as a Menace, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/health/e-cigarette-vape-njoy-bankruptcy.html.
53 See K.E. Farsalinos et al., Nicotine Absorption from Electronic Cigarette Use: Comparison
between First and New-Generation Devices, 4 SCI. REP. 4133 (2014) (reporting increased
popularity of open-system devices). There is also some evidence that use of opensystem devices is associated with greater success in quitting smoking. See S.C.
Hitchman et al., Associations Between E-cigarette Type, Frequency of Use, and Quitting
Smoking: Findings from a Longitudinal Online Panel Survey in Great Britain, 17 NICOTINE
& TOBACCO RES. 1187, 1191 (2015).
50
51
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networks and market power in retail outlets to push their product
lines. 54 Increased regulation could help major cigarette
manufacturers establish a dominant position in a less dynamic and
less innovative market—which could explain why tobacco
companies have been supportive of e-cigarette regulation.55
B. POTENTIAL HEALTH EFFECTS
Much is still unknown about the potential health effects of ecigarettes, particularly their prolonged use. 56 Nonetheless, there is a
fairly widespread consensus that e-cigarettes pose a tiny fraction of
the risks posed by cigarettes.57 The primary reason for this is that ecigarettes do not involve combustion and therefore do not expose the
user (or others) to the thousands of contaminants that are found in

See Jilian Mincer & Martinne Geller, A BAT Deal with Reynolds Adds to Big Tobacco's
E-Cig Advantage, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/usreynolds-amricn-m-a-vape-analysis-idUSKCN12P2YW; Rich Duprey, Altria Group
Inc. Tries to Save the E-Cig Industry, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Aug. 6, 2016),
https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/08/06/altria-group-inc-tries-to-save-the-ecig-industry.aspx.
55 See Adler et al., supra note 49, at 348-49.
56 See generally Dinakar & O’Connor, supra note 41, at 1372 (noting “long-term effects”
of e-cigarette use are “unknown”).
57 See Cahn & Siegel, supra note 43, at 18 (“Although the existing research does not
warrant a conclusion that electronic cigarettes are safe in absolute terms and further
clinical studies are needed to comprehensively assess the safety of electronic
cigarettes, a preponderance of the available evidence shows them to be much safer
than tobacco cigarettes and comparable in toxicity to conventional nicotine
replacement products.”). See generally Hajek et al., supra note 40, at 1806 (concluding
that e-cigarettes are likely to be much less harmful to users and bystanders than
cigarettes); Fiore et al., supra note 2, at 298 (“Evidence shows that all the
noncombustible delivery vehicles are substantially less dangerous than combustible
tobacco products, though that’s not to say they are totally safe.”).
54
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smoke. 58 As the FDA has itself acknowledged, “the inhalation of
nicotine (i.e., nicotine without the products of combustion) is of less
risk to the user than the inhalation of nicotine delivered by smoke
from combusted tobacco products.” 59 As one recent review of the
available scientific literature concluded, e-cigarettes “contain some
toxicants in concentrations much lower than in tobacco smoke and
negligible concentrations of carcinogens.” 60 The FDA likewise noted
such findings when proposing to deem e-cigarettes as tobacco
products subject to FDA regulation, reporting that “several studies
support the notion that the quantity of toxicants [in e-cigarette vapor]
is significantly less than those in tobacco cigarettes and tobacco
smoke and similar to those contained in recognized nicotinereplacement therapies.”61
E-cigarettes also do not appear to pose the same threat to
bystanders or non-consumers as do tobacco cigarettes. 62 This is

Cahn & Siegel, supra note 43, at 17 (“Theoretically, we would expect vaping to be less
harmful than smoking as it delivers nicotine without the thousands of known and
unknown toxicants in tobacco smoke.”).
59 Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 28981.
60 See Hajek et al., supra note 40, at 1801; see also Maciej L. Goniewicz, et al., Exposure to
Nicotine and Selected Toxicants in Cigarette Smokers Who Switched to Electronic Cigarettes:
A Longitudinal Within-Subjects Observational Study, 19 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 160
(2017) (finding that after smokers switched to e-cigarettes, exposure to selected
carcinogens and toxicants declined substantially, while nicotine exposure was
unchanged).
61 Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act;
Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning
Statements for Tobacco Products; Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 23,157 (April 25, 2014)
[hereinafter “Proposed Deeming Rule”].
62 See Pub. Health Eng., E-Cigarettes in Public Places and Workplaces (July 6, 2016),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-e-cigarettes-in-public-places
-and-workplaces/e-cigarettes-in-public-places-and-workplaces-a-5-point-guide-to-p
olicy-making (“[I]nternational peer-reviewed evidence indicates that the risk to the
58
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because e-cigarettes do not produce “side-stream” smoke and do not
remain burning while being used (indeed, as already noted, ecigarettes do not burn at all).63 Preliminary studies have also failed to
identify significant exposures to vapor components in areas where ecigarettes have been used.64 Much more research on the health effects
of e-cigarettes needs to be done, but the research to date is largely
supportive of the claims that vaping is vastly less dangerous than
smoking.
Despite the weight of existing research, public health officials in
the United States have been ambivalent to hostile about the lifesaving and harm-reducing potential of e-cigarettes.65 Their reticence

health of bystanders from secondhand e-cigarette vapour is extremely low and
insufficient to justify prohibiting e-cigarettes.”).
63 See MCNEILL ET AL., supra note 6, at 76 (noting that “the health risks of passive
exposure to electronic cigarette vapour are likely to be extremely low”). Side-stream
smoke is one component of secondhand smoke. Different from mainstream smoke,
which is secondhand smoke that is exhaled by a smoker, side-stream smoke is
produced by the combusting tip of a cigarette or other tobacco product. See Health Risks
of Secondhand Smoke, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer
causes/tobaccocancer/secondhand-smoke (last updated Nov. 13, 2015).
64 See, e.g., LEONARD M. ZWACK, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HEALTH HAZARD EVALUATION REPORT 2015-0107-3279, EVALUATION OF CHEMICAL
EXPOSURES AT A VAPE SHOP 13 (July 2017), http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe
/reports/pdfs/2015-0107-3279.pdf (employee exposure to diacetyl and 2,3pentanedione in the air was below applicable occupational exposure limits); Jan
Czogala, et al., Secondhand Exposure to Vapors from Electronic Cigarettes, 16 NICOTINE &
TOBACCO RES. 655 (2014) (reporting e-cigarettes are a source of secondhand exposure
to nicotine but not to combustion toxicants). But see Wolfgang Schober, et al., Use of
Electronic Cigarettes (E-cigarettes) Impairs Indoor Air Quality and Increases FeNO Levels of
E-cigarette Consumers, 217 INTL. J. HYGIENE & ENVTL HEALTH 628 (2014).
65 The U.S. Surgeon General produced an alarmist report about youth consumption of
e-cigarettes and urging greater government regulation to reduce youth access to
vaping products. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG
YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2016), https://ecigarettes.surgeongeneral.gov/documents/2016_sgr_full_report_non-508.pdf.
Curiously, the Surgeon General’s report did not address the evidence that increases in
youth consumption may have come at the expense of youth smoking, and did not even
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has not been matched overseas. In 2014, Public Health England (the
research arm of the United Kingdom’s Department of Health)
produced a comprehensive report surveying the available medical
literature on e-cigarettes and concluded that e-cigarettes are
significantly less harmful than other tobacco products, cigarettes in
particular. 66 A follow-up report published in 2015 was even more
emphatic about this conclusion. 67 Among other things, the 2015
report cited favorably the conclusion of an international expert panel
estimating that e-cigarettes pose no more than five percent of the risk
posed by tobacco cigarettes to users and others combined.68 Recent
research seems to indicate a potential for relatively significant and
rapid health gains for smokers who switch to e-cigarettes.69

cite (let alone discuss) multiple peer-reviewed studies suggesting that regulatory
measures to reduce youth consumption of e-cigarettes could increase traditional
cigarette consumption. See Abigail S. Friedman, How Do Electronic Cigarettes Affect
Adolescent Smoking?, 44 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 300 (2015), http://www.sciencedirect
.com/science/article/pii/S0167629615001150; Michael F. Pesko et al., The Influence of
Electronic Cigarette Age Purchasing Restrictions on Adolescent Tobacco and Marijuana Use,
87 PREVENTATIVE MED. 207 (2016), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article
/pii/S0091743516000396?via%3Dihub; Michael F. Pesko & Janet M. Currie, The Effect
of E-Cigarette Minimum Legal Sale Age Laws on Traditional Cigarette Use and Birth
Outcomes among Pregnant Teenagers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 22792, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22792. For a critique of the Surgeon
General’s report, see Riccardo Polosa et al., A Critique of the US Surgeon General’s
Conclusions Regarding E-Cigarette Use among Youth and Young Adults in the United States
of America, 14 HARM REDUCTION J. 61 (2017).
66 JOHN BRITTON & ILZE BOGDANOVICA, PUB. HEALTH ENG., ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES
(2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/311887/Ecigarettes_report.pdf.
67 See MCNEILL ET AL., supra note 6.
68 See David J. Nutt et al., Estimating the Harms of Nicotine-Containing Products Using the
MCDA Approach, 20 EUR. ADDICTION RES. 218 (2014). The 2015 Public Health UK report
concluded this was a “reasonable estimate.” MCNEILL ET AL., supra note 6, at 80.
69 See, e.g., Stephen S. Hecht et al., Evaluation of Toxicant and Carcinogen Metabolites in
the Urine of E-Cigarettes Users Versus Cigarette Smokers, 17 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES.
704 (2015); Riccardo Polosa, Electronic Cigarette Use and Harm Reversal: Emerging Evidence
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Because e-cigarettes appear to present far fewer risks than
tobacco cigarettes, some public health advocates encourage the use
and promotion of e-cigarettes by current smokers. 70 The Royal
College of Physicians, for example, has encouraged the promotion of
e-cigarettes as an aid in smoking cessation. 71 This view is more
widely advanced by public health entities in the United Kingdom
than the United States.72 The FDA, however, has acknowledged that
e-cigarettes “may have the potential to reduce the death and disease
toll from overall tobacco product use depending on who uses the
products and how they are used.”73
One reason some public health advocates are open to
encouraging e-cigarette use as a potential aid in smoking cessation is
because many smokers find it very difficult to quit.74 Pharmaceutical
companies have developed a range of nicotine-containing products
to aid in smoking cessation; however, such so-called NRTs, including
gums, patches, lozenges, and inhalers, have had limited results. 75
The quit rates for smokers using such products remains disturbingly

in the Lung, 13 BMC MED. 54, 54 (2015) (“[S]mokers completely switching to regular
EC use are likely to gain significant health benefits.”).
70 See, e.g., Franck, et al., supra note 44; Cahn & Siegel, supra note 7.
71 See, e.g., ROYAL COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, NICOTINE WITHOUT SMOKE: TOBACCO HARM
REDUCTION (Apr., 2016), https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/projects/outputs/nicotinewithout-smoke-tobacco-harm-reduction-0 (encouraging the use of e-cigarettes and
other tobacco alternatives as a means of curbing smoking).
72 See Sharon H. Green, Ronald Bayer, & Amy L. Fairchild, Evidence, Policy, and ECigarettes—Will England Reframe the Debate?, 374 N. ENG. J. MED. 1301 (2016), http://
www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/NEJMp1601154. See also Sabrina Tavernise, Safer to Puff,
E-Cigarettes Can’t Shake Their Reputation as a Menace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2016.
73 Proposed Deeming Rule, supra note 61, at 23,147.
74 See Fiore, et al., supra note 2, at 298 (“[M]any smokers build an extensive history of
failed quit attempts.”)
75 See Fiore, et al., supra note 2, at 298 (“current smoking-cessation treatments fail for
the majority of smokers who use them . . . .”).
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low.76 Are e-cigarettes the answer? Not for everyone, but e-cigarettes
and similar products can help at least some smokers who are trying
to reduce their cigarette consumption or quit altogether. 77 As ecigarette use has increased, smoking rates have declined. Perhaps
more significantly, the increase in e-cigarette use appears associated
with an increase in smoking cessation. 78
Preliminary research suggests that, at least for some smokers, ecigarettes may be a more effective smoking cessation aid than
existing NRTs.79 One reason for this is that e-cigarettes do a better job
of mimicking the smoking experience and smoking-related
behaviors than available NRTs.80 Nicotine addiction is not the only

See, e.g., David Moore et al., Effectiveness and Safety of Nicotine Replacement Therapy
Assisted Reduction to Stop Smoking: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 338 BRIT. MED.
J. 867 (2009); Shu-Hong Zhu et al., Interventions to Increase Smoking Cessation at the
Population Level: How Much Progress Has Been Made in the Last Two Decades?, 21
TOBACCO CONTROL 110 (2012). An older survey article indicates the low success rate
of NRTs. See J.R. Hughes et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Efficacy of Over-the-Counter
Nicotine Replacement, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 21 (2003).
77 See Jamie Brown, et al., Real-world Effectiveness of E-cigarettes When Used to Aid
Smoking Cessation: A Cross-sectional Population Study, 109 ADDICTION 1531 (2014).
78 See Shu-Hong Zhu, et al., E-cigarette Use and Associated Changes in Population Smoking
Cessation: Evidence from US Current Population Surveys, 358 BMJ 3262 (2017).
79 See Brown et al., supra note 77; Michael D. Stein et al., An Open Trial of Electronic
Cigarettes for Smoking Cessation Among Methadone-Maintained Smokers, 18 NICOTINE &
TOBACCO RES. 1157 (2016); Victoria A. Nelson et al., Comparison of the Characteristics of
Long-Term Users of Electronic Cigarettes Versus Nicotine Replacement Therapy, 153 DRUG
& ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 300 (Aug. 1, 2015). See also Cristina Russo et al., Evaluation
of Post Cessation Weight Gain in a 1-Year Randomized Smoking Cessation Trial of Electronic
Cigarettes, SCI. REPS. (2016), http://www.nature.com/articles/srep18763 (finding
evidence use of e-cigarettes may help limit post-smoking cessation weight gain). While
e-cigarettes may be more effective than existing NRTs for some smokers, most existing
research suggests that any smoking cessation aid is more effective when used in
combination with behavioral therapy.
80 See Brown et al., supra note 77; see also Dinakar & O’Connor, supra note 41, at 1372
(noting e-cigarettes provide “an experience for the user that is closer to cigarette
smoking than the forms of nicotine-replacement therapy that have been approved by
the Food & Drug Administration”).
76
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reason smokers continue to smoke. For at least some smokers,
aspects of the addiction are behavioral. 81
E-cigarette manufacturers have made numerous product design
changes over the past decade to make the vaping experience more
satisfying to current and former smokers. With continued
innovation, the ability of e-cigarettes to help wean smokers from
tobacco could further improve. On the other hand, insofar as
regulation hampers continued innovation in this market and reduces
the availability of e-cigarette products, the harm reduction potential
of e-cigarettes is constrained.
None of this is to say that e-cigarettes are risk-free. Some
chemicals contained in vaping fluids are potentially toxic, even if
they appear to be present at significantly lower levels than cigarette
smoke.82 More concerning to some, many flavoring chemicals have
not been subjected to meaningful testing. 83 News reports have
highlighted the possibility of e-cigarette battery explosions84 and the
lack of quality control, particularly among smaller manufacturers. 85

See Dinakar & O’Connor, supra note 41, at 1372.
See MCNEILL ET AL., supra note 6, at 80 ("While vaping may not be 100% safe, most
of the chemicals causing smoking-related disease are absent and the chemicals that are
present pose limited danger."); Dinakar & O’Connor, supra note 41, at 1376 (noting
potentially toxic substances in e-cigarette aerosol under normal use conditions “are
found in substantially lower concentrations . . . that in the smoke from tobacco
cigarettes”).
83 See Andrey Khlystov et al, Flavoring Compounds Dominate Toxic Aldehyde Production
During E-Cigarette Vaping, ENVTL SCI. & TECH. (2016) http://pubs.acs.org/doi
/abs/10.1021/acs.est.6b05145.
84 See Elisha G. Brownson, M.D., et al., Letter to the Editor, Explosion Injuries from ECigarettes, 375 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 1400 (Oct. 6, 2016).
85 See Matt Richtel, Selling a Poison by the Barrel. Liquid Nicotine for e-Cigarettes, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/business/selling-apoison-by-the-barrel-liquid-nicotine-for-e-cigarettes.html; David Barboza, China's eCigarette Boom Lacks Oversight for Safety, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014), https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/12/14/business/international/chinas-e-cigarette-boom-lacks81
82
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Labeling of e-cigarettes and vaping fluids can be inconsistent,
particularly by smaller firms, and nicotine dosages are not always
consistent.86
The nicotine levels contained in most e-cigarettes do not appear
to pose a meaningful health risk,87 but the concentration of nicotine
in vaping fluid can pose significant risks if consumed directly,
particularly if consumed by children. 88 The FDA has proposed
separate regulations to address this risk directly. 89 Nonetheless,
nicotine remains a highly addictive substance, and insofar as ecigarettes introduce consumers to nicotine, they could provide for a
pathway to nicotine addiction and consequent negative health
effects. Of course, existing nicotine replacement therapies (NRTs)

oversight-for-safety-.html (discussing concerns about lack of oversight of imported ecigarette products, including vaping fluid).
86 See Britton & Bogdanovica, supra note 66, at 7.
87 See Britton & Bogdanovica, supra note 66, at 7; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS, supra note 65. Cf. Jeremy Samuel Faust, E-Cigarettes Might Be the Best
Addiction to Have, SLATE (Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_
and_science/medical_examiner/2016/12/the_surgeon_general_s_report_on_e_cigar
ettes_is_surprisingly_mild.html.
88 The American Academy of Pediatrics warns that even small amounts of liquid
nicotine used to fill e-cigarette or ENDS cartridges can be deadly when consumed by
children or spilled on a child’s skin. See Trisha Korioth, Liquid Nicotine Used in ECigarettes Can Kill Children, HEALTHYCHILDREN.ORG (last updated Oct. 20, 2015),
https://www.healthychildren.org/English/safety-prevention/at-home/Pages/Liqu
id-Nicotine-Used-in-E-Cigarettes-Can-Kill-Children.aspx.
89 See Nicotine Exposure Warnings and Child-Resistant Packaging for Liquid Nicotine,
Nicotine-Containing E-Liquid(s), and Other Tobacco Products; Request for
Comments, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,555 (July 1, 2015). In August 2015, the FDA extended the
comment period for a proposed rule intended to reduce the danger liquid nicotine
poses to children. See Nicotine Exposure Warnings and Child-Resistant Packaging for
Liquid Nicotine, Nicotine-Containing E-Liquid(s), and Other Tobacco Products;
Request for Comments; Extension of Comment Period, 80 Fed. Reg. 51,146 (Aug. 24,
2015).
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contain nicotine as well and often expose users to some of the same
compounds found in e-cigarette vapor.90
At present, it appears that most e-cigarette users are current or
former smokers.91 So long as this holds true, e-cigarettes would seem
to have substantial harm reduction potential. There are some
concerns about increases in e-cigarette consumption among youth.92
In recent years, youth e-cigarette use increased as cigarette smoking
declined.93 This data suggested a possible substitution effect: Those
youth who would otherwise have tried smoking may have been
trying vaping instead.94 While survey data on youth smoking are not
particularly reliable, the most recent data suggest that youth ecigarette use may have started to decline. 95 Youth e-cigarette

See Lion Shabab, et al., Nicotine, Carcinogen, and Toxin Exposure in Long-Term ECigarette and Nicotine Replacement Therapy Users: A Cross-sectional Study, 166 ANNALS
OF INTERNAL MED. 390 (2017).
91 As the FDA noted:
Data reported by the CDC's National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS),
which provides the first estimates of e-cigarette use among U.S. adults from
a nationally representative household interview study, indicate that current
cigarette smokers and recent former smokers (i.e., those individuals who
quit smoking within the past year) were more likely to use e-cigarettes than
long-term former smokers (i.e., those individuals who quit smoking more
than one year ago) and adults who had never smoked.
Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 29028.
92 See Matt Richtel, Use of E-Cigarettes by Young People Is Major Concern, Surgeon General
Declares, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/health/ecigarettes-united-states.html.
93 Id.
94 See, e.g. Friedman, supra note 65; Pesko, et al., supra note 65. See also Jacob Sullum,
New Study Provides Strong Evidence That E-Cigarettes Boost Smoking Cessation, REASON
(July 27, 2017), http://reason.com/blog/2017/07/27/news-study-provides-strongevidence-that.
95 See Rob Stein, Teens' Use Of E-Cigarettes Drops For The First Time, CDC Says, NPR
(June 15, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/06/15/533062545
/teens-use-of-e-cigarettes-drops-for-the-first-time-cdc-says; see also Polosa, et al., supra
note 41.
90
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consumption is a serious concern nonetheless, and it is
understandable why anti-smoking activists are wary of an industry
that stands to profit by addicting younger consumers. Nonetheless,
the empirical evidence to date suggests e-cigarette use may be
substituting for tobacco use—a gain for public health—and there is
little evidence that e-cigarettes are serving as a “gateway” to tobacco
use.96
III. THE FDA’S DEEMING RULE
In May 2016, the United States Food & Drug Administration
(FDA) finalized regulations “deeming” e-cigarettes and other vaping
products as “tobacco products” subject to regulation under the
Tobacco Act.97 In reaching this decision, the FDA determined that ecigarettes “should be regulated due to their potential for public
harm.”98 According to the agency, regulating e-cigarettes and similar
products “is necessary to learn more about that potential.”99 This rule
applies to all e-cigarettes and vaping products, including their

“E-cigarettes are not a gateway to smoking,” according to the Royal College of
Physicians. “[I]n the UK, use of e-cigarettes is limited almost entirely to those who are
already using, or have used, tobacco.” Promote E-cigarettes Widely as Substitute for
Smoking Says New RCP Report, ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS (Apr. 28, 2016),
https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/news/promote-e-cigarettes-widely-substitutesmoking-says-new-rcp-report.
97 Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39.
98 Id. at 28,983.
99 Id. at 28,984.
96
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components and parts, 100 as well as to new products that may be
used to deliver nicotine or tobacco in the future. 101
In deeming e-cigarettes to be subject to federal regulation, the
FDA declared that e-cigarettes “meet the statutory definition of
‘tobacco products’” because the nicotine in e-cigarettes is “made or
derived from tobacco.” 102 It further extended regulatory authority to
e-cigarette “parts and components,” including the various parts of
open-system devices whether sold in combination or separately, but
not e-cigarette accessories or nicotine-free liquids provided such
liquids were not intended to be combined with nicotine-containing
liquids. 103 In July 2017, a federal district court rejected a legal
challenge to the broad scope of the FDA’s rule.104
With the deeming rule, the FDA effectively extended the Act’s
regulatory framework to e-cigarettes. This includes requiring
manufacturers to register and disclose product contents, prohibiting
the sale of adulterated or misbranded products, and limiting

According to the FDA, regulated components and parts include: “E-liquids;
atomizers; batteries (with or without variable voltage); cartomizers (atomizer plus
replaceable fluid-filled cartridge); digital display/lights to adjust settings;
clearomisers, tank systems, flavors, vials that contain e-liquids, [and] programmable
software.” Id. at 29,074.
101 According to the FDA, “FDA envisions that there could be tobacco products
developed in the future that provide nicotine delivery through means (e.g., via dermal
absorption or intranasal spray) similar to currently marketed medicinal nicotine
products, but which are not drugs or devices. These products would be “tobacco
products” and subject to FDA's chapter IX authorities in accordance with this final
deeming rule.” Id. at 28,976.
102 Id. at 28,976 ; see also 21 U.S.C. § 387a (defining tobacco products).
103 Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 28,995, 28,974, 29,032.
104 See Nicopure Laps LLC v. FDA, No. CV 16-0878 (ABJ), 2017 WL 3130312, at *6
(D.D.C. July 21, 2017). In separate litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit rejected a challenge to Department of Transportation decision to prohibit ecigarette use on commercial airlines under the pre-existing authority to prohibit
smoking. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Dept. of Trans., 863 F.3d 911 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
100
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advertising and promotional activities. Under the deeming rule, the
FDA also prohibited sales to minors, mandated health warnings on
product packaging, and severely limited vending machine sales.
Perhaps most significantly, the FDA’s deeming rule imposed a premarket approval requirement on all e-cigarette products developed
in the past ten years. 105 This rule is likely to produce significant
consolidation within the e-cigarette industry, largely to the benefit of
major tobacco companies, while simultaneously reducing innovation
and the harm reduction potential of e-cigarettes.
While acknowledging the evidence that e-cigarettes are in all
likelihood less harmful than tobacco cigarettes, the FDA claimed that
the rule would benefit public health “by affording FDA critical
information regarding the health risks of such products,” preventing
the marketing and sale of “new” products without prior FDA
approval, and “preventing the use of unsubstantiated modified risk
claims, which may mislead consumers and lead them to initiate
tobacco product use or to continue using tobacco when they would
otherwise quit.” 106 The FDA also acknowledged that one
consequence of the rule is likely to be “considerable product
consolidation and exit.”107

See Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 28,974. See also Tripp Mickle, FDA Cloud
Hangs Over Vape Shops, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10130211234592774869404581088451777513530.
106 Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 28,976.
107 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, Docket No. FDA-2014-N-0189 Deeming
Tobacco Products to be Subject to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by
the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Regulations Restricting the
Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for
Tobacco Product Packages and Advertisements: Final Regulatory Impact Analysis,
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Analysis 78,
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/reports/econo
micanalyses/ucm500254.pdf [hereinafter Final Regulatory Impact Analysis].
105
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The FDA says it “expects” that regulation of e-cigarettes will
improve public “understanding and appreciation of the health
effects and risks” of such products. 108 This is because, according to
the FDA, regulating e-cigarettes will require producers to disclose
product contents to the FDA and enable the agency to prevent
misleading claims about e-cigarettes. 109 In the FDA’s view, the
primary consumer misperception that needs to be addressed is that
“tobacco products not regulated by FDA are safe alternatives to
currently regulated tobacco products.”110 Yet the survey data cited
by the FDA in finalizing the deeming rule shows that far more adults
believe that e-cigarettes are equally or more harmful than tobacco
cigarettes than believe that e-cigarettes are not harmful.111
Recent surveys find that a substantial percentage of adults
believe that e-cigarettes are as harmful or more harmful than
conventional tobacco cigarettes. 112 In one recent state survey, a

Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 29,036.
Proposed Deeming Rule, supra note 61, at 23,148.
110 Proposed Deeming Rule, supra note 61, at 23,148.
111 The final rule cites Reference 176 throughout its discussion of misinformation and
confusion about e-cigarettes. See Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 29,036 (citing
HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUBL. HEALTH & STAT, AMERICANS’ PERSPECTIVES ON ECIGARETTES (2015), https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/94/
2015/11/Stat-Harvard-Poll-Oct-2015-Americans-Perspectives-on-E-Cigarettes.pdf);
cf. HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUBL. HEALTH & STAT, AMERICANS’ PERSPECTIVES ON
E-CIGARETTES
8
(2015),
https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads
/sites/94/2015/11/Stat-Harvard-Poll-Oct-2015-Americans-Perspectives-on-ECigarettes.pdf (reporting 23 percent of respondents believe e-cigarettes are not
harmful and 38 percent believe e-cigarettes are as harmful or more harmful than
tobacco cigarettes)).
112 Id. (reporting 32 percent and 6 percent of surveyed adults believe e-cigarettes are as
harmful or more harmful than tobacco cigarettes, respectively). In this survey, fewer
than half of those surveyed (44 percent) responded that e-cigarettes are less harmful
than tobacco cigarettes. See also Marc T. Kiviniemi & Lynn T. Kozlowski, Deficiencies in
Public Understanding about Tobacco Harm Reduction: Results from a United States National
Survey, 12 HARM REDUCTION J. 21 (2015).
108
109
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majority of respondents either did not know or believe that ecigarettes are likely less harmful than tobacco cigarettes. 113 Other
survey data suggest that perceptions of e-cigarettes as equally or
more dangerous than tobacco cigarettes increased in tandem with
efforts to subject e-cigarettes to greater regulation.114
As with prior limitations on advertising and promotion, the
deeming rule is likely to advantage larger incumbent firms at the
expense of smaller e-cigarette producers. In practical terms, these
requirements are most likely to advantage the major tobacco
companies, which have also entered the e-cigarette market.115 Both
Altria and Reynolds have e-cigarette brands that they may promote
and market through their established marketing and distribution
networks. The same market dynamics that enable these firms to
dominate the cigarette market will give them a substantial
competitive advantage in the e-cigarette market, particularly as
smaller retailers, such as vape shops, are squeezed by the new

See INTERACT FOR HEALTH, Most Ohio Adults Support Regulating, Taxing E-Cigarettes,
in OHIP 2015: OHIO HEALTH ISSUES POLL (Jan. 2016) https://www.interactforhealth
.org/upl/Most_Ohio_adults_support_regulating_taxing_e_cigarettes.pdf; see also
Michael Siegel, New Ohio Poll Shows that Anti-Vaping Groups Have Completely
Undermined the Public's Appreciation of the Hazards of Smoking, THE REST OF THE STORY:
TOBACCO NEWS ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY (Jan. 26, 2016), http://tobaccoanalysis.
blogspot.com/2016/01/new-ohio-poll-shows-that-anti-vaping.html.
114 See Ban A. Majeed et al., Changing Perceptions of Harm of E-Cigarettes Among U.S.
Adults, 2012-2015, 52 AMER. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 331 (2017) (reporting increase in
percentage of respondents who believe e-cigarettes are equally or more harmful than
tobacco cigarettes from 12.8 percent in 2012 to 39.8 percent in 2015). According to some
commentators, misleading statements by public health officials may be contributing
to public misperception about the relative risk posed by e-cigarettes. See, e.g., Jacob
Sullum, Why is the CDC Lying About E-Cigarettes? FORBES, Apr. 23, 2015, https://
www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2015/04/23/why-is-the-cdc-lying-about-ecigarettes/#60b97075a23d.
115 As Jack Calfee has documented, prior regulation of cigarette advertising has often
worked to the advantage of larger firms. See, e.g. John E. Calfee, The Ghost of Cigarette
Advertising Past, REG. (Jun. 1, 1997).
113
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rules.116 Many of the marketing methods that new entrants might use
to gain market share are effectively precluded by the marketing
regulations.
More significantly, the deeming rule requires all e-cigarette
manufacturers to obtain pre-market approval for all new products.117
As interpreted by the FDA, this requirement is imposed quite
broadly. Any change in product design, flavoring, or packaging can
constitute a new product. 118 Each vape shop that mixes or bottles
fluids is likewise considered a manufacturer, as they are creating
“new” products each time they create a new flavor or otherwise
modify a fluid or e-cigarette component.119 This has stoked fears that
the regulation will force many vape shops and independent firms to
close. 120 It is also likely to hamper innovation and the development

At one point, Reynolds encouraged the FDA to ban all “open-system” vaping
products. See Richard Craver, Reynolds American Wants FDA to Ban Vapor e-Cigarettes,
WINSTON-SALEM J. (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.journalnow.com/business/businessnews/local/reynolds-american-wants-fda-to-ban-vapor-e-cigarettes/article 77b131f5
-540d-5f02-927c-733bac751529.html.
117 Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 28,976.
118 See 21 U.S.C. § 387j. The FDA has indicated that even relatively modest changes in
product design or packaging will be sufficient to identify a product as a new tobacco
product, and not substantially equivalent to a product already on the market. See FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: DEMONSTRATING THE SUBSTANTIAL
EQUIVALENCE OF A NEW TOBACCO PRODUCT: RESPONSES TO FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS (3d ed. Dec. 2016), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads
/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/UCM436468.pdf.
119 According to the FDA:
[E]stablishments that mix or prepare e-liquids or create or modify
aerosolizing apparatus for direct sale to consumers are tobacco product
manufacturers under the definition set forth in the FD&C Act and,
accordingly, are subject to the same legal requirements that apply to other
tobacco product manufacturers.
Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 28979.
120 See Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Imposes Rules for E-Cigarettes in a Landmark Move, N.Y.
TIMES (May 5, 2016), http://nyti.ms/23rXQXX; Shari Rudavsky, Indiana Vape Shop
Owners Say New FDA Rule Will Crush Industry, INDY STAR (May 9, 2016)
116
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of new products in what had been a very dynamic and competitive
market.
The pre-market approval requirement also applies retroactively
to all products introduced since February 2007. As a practical matter,
this means most traditional tobacco products are grandfathered.
Tobacco companies do not need to apply to the FDA to keep their
cigarettes on the market. Nearly all currently marketed e-cigarette
brands, on the other hand, entered the market after February 2007.
This is an additional reason why the deeming rule works to the
advantage of the major tobacco companies. 121
The grandfathering date was not determined by the FDA, it is
required under the Tobacco Act. 122 Under this requirement,
manufacturers of any e-cigarette or vaping product, including parts
and components, must submit an application for approval for any
product that was not on the market in February 2007 or not the
substantial equivalent of a product that was then on the market. For
those products that are “substantial equivalents,” a separate
application must be filed. Based upon how the FDA has applied this

http://www.indystar.com/story/news/2016/05/08/indiana-vape-shop-ownerssay-new-fda-rule-crush-industry/84036264/.
121 Perhaps tellingly, when the FDA announced it would delay the deadline for
submitting new tobacco product applications for e-cigarettes and other newly deemed
products, share prices for the major cigarette companies “tumbled.” See Sheila Kaplan,
F.D.A. Delays Rules That Would Have Limited E-Cigarettes on Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2017.
122 During the rulemaking, the FDA received comments urging the adoption of a later
date, but concluded that under the terms of the Tobacco Act, the agency lacked the
flexibility to change it.
FDA has determined that it lacks authority to change the grandfather date,
which is set by statute (79 FR 23142 at 23174). FDA specifically asked for
comments on our legal interpretation. We received a large number of
comments in response to this statement, but none provided a legal theory
that would support changing the date.
Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 28993.
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standard to tobacco products, e-cigarette manufacturers can expect
“substantial equivalence” to be applied quite stringently. 123 Even
changes to packaging, labeling, and product size are enough for the
FDA to consider something to be a new product. 124
Although manufacturers are given some time to submit their
applications,125 this requirement means that virtually all e-cigarette
and vaping products on the market must go through a lengthy and
costly FDA approval process.126 The time and money involved with
submitting a new product are likely to be quite substantial. 127
According to the FDA, each premarket review application could cost
between $200,000 and $2,000,000.128 These requirements are likely to

See Micah Berman, “Substantial Equivalence”: Massive Backlog at the FDA Center for
Tobacco Products, JREG NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 16, 2015), http://yalejreg.com
/nc/substantial-equivalence-massive-backlog-at-the-fda-center-for-tobaccoproducts-by-micah-berman/.
124 See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 118.
125 Under the rule, manufacturers of products that are not the substantial equivalent of
products marketed prior to February 2007 will have between 12 and 24 months to
submit their applications, and an additional 12-month compliance period while
applications are being reviewed. In July 2017, the FDA announced it would delay these
requirements by several more years as the agency develops a more comprehensive
regulatory strategy to address nicotine addiction. See Press Release, Food & Drug
Admin., FDA Announces Comprehensive Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of
Tobacco-Related Disease, Death (July 28, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents
/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm568923.htm.
126 As the FDA acknowledged when proposing the deeming rule, “most proposed
deemed tobacco products would be considered new tobacco products and would be
required to obtain an order from FDA prior to marketing.” Proposed Deeming Rule,
supra note 61, at 23,174.
127 According to some estimates, the cost for each approval could exceed one million
dollars. See Tavernise, supra note 120 (citing estimate that “submitting an application
to get a product approved would take more than 1,700 hours and cost more than $1
million.”).
128 See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEEMING TOBACCO PRODUCTS TO BE SUBJECT
TO THE FDCA: FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 87 (Table 11(a)) (2014), https://
www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/reports/economicanaly
123
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impose substantial burdens on smaller manufacturers and
distributors and further enhance the competitive advantage of
traditional cigarette manufacturers that seek to make inroads within
the e-cigarette market. 129 As of this writing, the only premarket
applications FDA has approved were those submitted by Swedish
Match for eight smokeless tobacco (“snus”) products. 130
The FDA claims that the deeming regulation will help safeguard
public health.131 Perhaps tellingly, though, the agency was not able
to identify any specific health (or other) benefits of the rule that
would come from the extension of regulatory oversight. As the FDA
confessed, “The direct benefits of making each of the newly deemed
tobacco products subject to the requirements of chapter IX of the
FD&C Act are difficult to quantify, and we cannot predict the size of
these benefits at this time.” 132 While acknowledging that e-cigarettes
are likely to be less harmful than tobacco cigarettes, 133 the FDA
maintains that regulation of e-cigarettes “will still benefit public
health,” even if it is not entirely sure how.134
Authorizing the agency to police misbranding claims and take
action against unsafe products could produce benefits, particularly if
the threat of liability is not sufficient to induce more responsible

ses/ucm500254.pdf. For delivery devices, the agency estimated a total cost of $285,656
to $2,622,224 per application. Id. at 90-91 (Table 12(a)).
129 See Tavernise, supra note 120. See also Adler et al., infra note 175.
130 See FDA Issues First Product Marketing Orders Through Premarket Tobacco Application
Pathway (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/press
announcements/ucm472026.htm. Actions on premarket applications are detailed by
the FDA at Marketing Orders for Tobacco Products, https://www.fda.gov/Tobacco
Products/Labeling/TobaccoProductReviewEvaluation/ucm339928.htm.
131 See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE FACTS ON THE FDA’S NEW TOBACCO RULE (June 16,
2016), https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm506676.htm.
132 Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 28,981.
133 Id. at 28,984.
134 See id.
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conduct by product manufacturers. The FDA’s ability to collect
content and other information from manufacturers could also
facilitate the development of more targeted and cost-beneficial
regulations in the future. It is also possible that regulation-induced
concentration within the industry could facilitate greater regulatory
oversight, as it will be easier for a federal agency to monitor and
police the activities of a small handful of large firms than to try and
monitor a dynamic, competitive marketplace with lots of smaller
firms and new entrants.
In issuing the deeming rule, the FDA hypothesized that greater
regulation will make some firms more willing to invest in new
products as they will not have to fear competition from “dangerous”
products. 135 A more concentrated market with fewer, more
established players may also be more likely to produce standardized
and reliable products than a myriad of smaller firms with varying
production standards and capabilities. Such benefits, however, are
difficult to quantify and should be weighed against the potential
costs of reducing the availability and attractiveness of e-cigarettes as
a substitute for tobacco cigarettes.
In July 2017, newly confirmed FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb
announced the agency would adopt a new “comprehensive
approach” to nicotine and tobacco in an effort to reduce the death toll

The FDA writes,
Greater regulatory certainty created by premarket authorizations should
help companies to invest in creating novel products, with greater confidence
that improved products will enter the market without having to compete
against equally novel, but more dangerous products. For example, a
company wishing to invest the additional resources needed to ensure that
its e-cigarette is designed and manufactured with appropriate methods and
controls will be more likely to do so if the product is not competing against
products that are more cheaply and crudely made, yet appear to be identical
to the consumer.
Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 28,983.
135
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from cigarettes. 136 While highlighting the threat posed by nicotine
addiction, Commissioner Gottlieb stressed that the “bigger problem
is the delivery mechanism,” i.e. smoking. 137 Further, Commissioner
Gottlieb said that the FDA must be attentive to “the potential for
innovation to lead to less harmful products . . . .”138 Accordingly, the
FDA would “reconsider aspects of the implementation of the final
deeming rule with an eye towards fostering innovation where
innovation could truly make a public health difference . . . .”139 The
FDA also announced that it would use its enforcement discretion to
extend the deadline for e-cigarette manufacturers to submit product
review applications, noting it “expects that manufacturers would
continue to market products while the agency reviews product
applications.”140
Commissioner Gottlieb’s July 2017 remarks suggest that he is
aware of the significant harm reduction potential of e-cigarettes and
other smoking alternatives. 141 While not questioning the need for
FDA regulation of alternative tobacco products, Commissioner
Gottlieb highlighted the need for innovation if smoking alternatives
are to help smokers wean themselves of their current habits, and that

See Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r Food & Drug Admin, Prepared Remarks, Protecting
American Families: Comprehensive Approach to Nicotine and Tobacco, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (July 28, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm56902
4.htm.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Announces Comprehensive
Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of Tobacco-Related Disease, Death (July 28, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm568923.
htm.
141 In an interview with reporters, Commissioner Gottlieb said the FDA thinks “there’s
a potential opportunity for e-cigarettes to be a lower-risk alternative to smokers who
want to quit combustible cigarettes.” Sheila Kaplan, F.D.A. Delays Rules That Would
Have Limited E-Cigarettes on Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2017.
136
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this should inform the FDA’s regulatory approach. Time will tell how
these priorities are operationalized.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL SPEECH
In addition to deeming e-cigarettes as tobacco products subject
to federal regulation, the FDA has also made clear its intention to
police the claims made by e-cigarette manufacturers and retailers
about the potential benefits of their products. According to the FDA,
e-cigarette producers and retailers may neither claim that their
products are less dangerous than tobacco cigarettes nor inform
consumers about the potential health benefits of switching from
smoking to vaping without first obtaining permission from the FDA.
Nor may e-cigarette companies tout the potential use of their
products to help smokers manage nicotine cravings or quit smoking
without first submitting any proposed claims for government
approval. As with the other regulations imposed on e-cigarettes,
these limitations could come at the expense of harm reduction.
Under the Tobacco Act, it is illegal to sell a “modified risk
tobacco product” (MRTP) without FDA approval. 142 The Act defines
an MRTP as “any tobacco product that is sold or distributed for use
to reduce harm or the risk of tobacco-related disease associated with
commercially marketed tobacco products.” 143 It further creates an
application process, somewhat similar to the approval process for
new drugs and devices, for MRTPs. 144 As the FDA noted in the
deeming rule, the prohibition on selling “modified risk” tobacco
products “applies automatically to deemed products.”145 As of this

See 21 U.S.C. § 387k(a).
See 21 U.S.C. § 387k(b)(1).
144 See 21 U.S.C. § 387k(g).
145 Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 29,039.
142
143
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writing, the FDA has yet to approve an MRTP application. 146 More
are pending, although none are for e-cigarettes.147
Unless and until the FDA approves an MRTP application,
producers are broadly prohibited from making claims that express
or imply that their product might be less risky than traditional
tobacco cigarettes. In particular, this means that producers may not
state “explicitly or implicitly” that
(I) the tobacco product presents a lower risk of tobaccorelated disease or is less harmful than one or more other
commercially marketed tobacco products;
(II) the tobacco product or its smoke contains a reduced level
of a substance or presents a reduced exposure to a substance;
or

See Jennifer Maloney, Big Tobacco Finds Surprise Allies in Smokeless Push, WALL ST. J.,
(July 21, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-tobacco-finds-surprise-allies-insmokeless-push-1500629402 (noting FDA partially rejected MRTP application filed by
Swedish Match and invited the firm to revise and resubmit the application). See also
Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Action on Applications Seeking to
Market Modified Risk Tobacco Products (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.fda.
gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm533219.htm.
147 Compare Richard Craver, Reynolds Enters FDA Modified-Risk Regulatory Gauntlet for 6
Camel Snus Styles, WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.journal
now.com/business/business_news/local/reynolds-enters-fda-modified-riskregulatory-gauntlet-for-camel-snus/article_da629984-1880-11e7-8da36f26ad193658.html (claiming the FDA approved Swedish Match snus as MRTPs,
however the FDA does not list any MRTP applications as having been approved), with
Modified Risk Tobacco Products, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Tobacco
Products/Labeling/MarketingandAdvertising/ucm304465.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2017). More likely this was a reference to the FDA’s approval of several Swedish Match
snus products as new tobacco products mentioned supra, note 130.
146
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(III) the tobacco product or its smoke does not contain or is
free of a substance.148
According to the FDA, this means that factually true claims, such
as “contains less nicotine” or “healthier alternative to smoking”
would likely cause a product to be deemed a MRTP, requiring FDA
approval. 149 As the agency explained in a follow-up rulemaking
designed to clarify the scope of FDA regulation of newly deemed
tobacco products,
A manufacturer’s making a modified risk claim for a specific
tobacco product renders the product an MRTP, which can be
marketed only after the manufacturer substantiates any
modified risk claims in an MRTP application and after FDA
determines that the product meets the statutory standard.150
In other words, an e-cigarette manufacturer or retailer that wants to
tell consumers basic facts about the product is prohibited from doing
so without first obtaining the FDA’s approval.
The FDA has also concluded that e-cigarette manufacturers may
not inform consumers about the potential of e-cigarettes to facilitate
smoking reduction or cessation without obtaining FDA approval as
a medical drug, device, or combination product. In January 2017, the
FDA adopted a regulation expressly providing that any tobacco
product “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of
disease, including use in the cure or treatment of nicotine addiction (e.g.,
smoking cessation), relapse prevention, or relief of nicotine withdrawal

See 21 U.S.C. § 387k(b)(2)(A)(i).
Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products, 82 Fed. Reg. 2193, 2205 (Jan. 9, 2017).
150 82 Fed. Reg. 2193, 2212 (Jan. 9, 2017).
148
149
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symptoms,” is “subject to regulation as a drug, device, or
combination product”. 151 As the FDA explained, “if an ENDS
product seeks to be marketed as a cessation product, the
manufacturer must file an application with FDA’s Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research (CDER) and no ENDS have been approved
by FDA as effective cessation aids.”152
As with modified risk claims, the FDA has adopted a fairly broad
conception of what sorts of claims could trigger regulation of an ecigarette as a medical product. For instance, the FDA noted that
“claims such as ‘treatment of tobacco dependence,’ ‘wean yourself
off of nicotine,’ ‘for people who wish to quit smoking,’ ‘stop smoking
aid,’ ‘prevent relapse,’ or ‘stay quit’ generally will bring a product
within” the parameters for regulation as a medical product. 153
Further, “if the instructions provided by the manufacturer convey
that the product is to be used as a cessation device, then the product
will generally be regulated as a medical product.” 154 As with the
regulation of medical devices, the FDA also made clear that in
determining the “intended use” of a product, the FDA will look at
“’any . . . relevant source,’ including but not limited to the product’s
labeling, promotional claims, and advertising.” 155
Although cigarettes and e-cigarettes may be viewed as
“recreational” products, marketing the latter as an alternative to the

21 C.F.R. § 1100.5. See also Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from
Tobacco Are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products, 82 Fed. Reg.
2193, 2194 (Jan. 9, 2017) (emphasis added).
152 Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 29,036.
153 82 Fed. Reg. 2193, 2205 (Jan. 9, 2017). The FDA expressly notes that these are just
illustrative examples and not an exclusive list. Id. at 2205 n.14.
154 82 Fed. Reg. 2193, 2212 (Jan. 9, 2017).
155 82 Fed. Reg. 2193, 2195 (Jan. 9, 2017) (citing Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris,
655 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and United States v. Storage Spaces, 777 F.2d 1363,
1366 (9th Cir. 1985), Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D.Minn.), aff’d 540
F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976)).
151
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former may land a manufacturer in hot water. This is because “FDA
considers claims about smoking cessation to be more than simply
‘consumer-oriented marketing statements.’” 156 As it explained,
“smoking cessation claims on any product generally create a strong
suggestion of intended therapeutic benefit to the user that generally
will be difficult to overcome absent clear context indicating that the
product is not intended for use to cure or treat nicotine addiction or
its symptoms, or for another therapeutic purpose.” 157 The FDA has
been quite explicit that, in its view, “The most important
consideration is that ENDS are not an FDA-approved cessation
product. If an ENDS manufacturer wishes to make a cessation claim
of otherwise market its product for therapeutic purposes, the
company must submit an application for their ENDS to be marketed
as a medical product.” 158 Although the FDA recognizes “there is
emerging data that some individual smokers may potentially use
ENDS to transition away from combustible tobacco products,” 159 it
does not believe e-cigarette manufacturers should be allowed to
provide consumers with this evidence unless and until FDA
agrees. 160 Any such efforts to encourage or facilitate smoking
cessation are only allowed if first approved by the FDA.
Although relevant Supreme Court precedent suggests that
government agencies should consider the use of mandatory
disclaimers or qualifying statements before prohibiting truthful
product claims,161 the FDA has thus far rejected the use of disclaimers

82 Fed. Reg. 2193, 2196 (Jan. 9, 2017).
Id. at 2198.
158 Final Deeming Rule, supra note 39, at 29,038.
159 Id. at 29,037.
160 The FDA has declared that “statements related to quitting smoking generally create
a strong suggestion that a product is intended for a therapeutic purpose.” 82 Fed. Reg.
2193, 2214 (Jan. 9, 2017).
161 See Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
156
157
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for either modified-risk or smoking cessation claims. In its January
rulemaking, the FDA declared that it “does not believe that
disclaimers will sufficiently mitigate consumer confusion due to the
product’s claimed therapeutic benefit.” 162 This position is
constitutionally suspect, but as of this writing has not been
challenged in court.
In its application and anticipated enforcement of the relevant
legal provisions, it is the FDA’s position that an e-cigarette
manufacturer is legally prohibited from informing consumers of the
FDA’s own conclusions about e-cigarettes without first obtaining the
FDA’s permission. Indeed, an e-cigarette manufacturer could be
sanctioned for merely quoting the FDA’s own statements in an
advertisement or on a webpage, even if followed by a prominent
disclaimer indicating that the FDA had not sanctioned or approved
the manufacturer’s claim. The FDA acknowledges that such a
prohibition may raise First Amendment concerns, but decided that
any such concerns could be “considered in a separate proceeding”
that would address First Amendment concerns about FDA
regulation more generally.163
The FDA justifies this position, in part, because “the potential for
consumer confusion is increasing” due to public claims made about
the potential for e-cigarettes to aid in smoking reduction or

82 Fed. Reg. 2199; See also id at 2203 (“FDA does not believe that disclaimers will be
sufficient in most cases to mitigate consumer confusion about whether a product made
or derived from tobacco is intended for medical use.”).
163 82 Fed. Reg. at 2209. As of this writing, litigation challenging the MRTP provisions
of the Tobacco Act have been unsuccessful. See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Inc.
v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012); Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, No. CV 160878 (ABJ), 2017 WL 3130312, at *11 (D.D.C. July 21, 2017). Nonetheless, there is reason
to believe that these restrictions raise the same sorts of First Amendment problems as
do prohibitions on off-label marketing of prescription pharmaceuticals or truthful
health claims about nutritional supplements.
162
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cessation. 164 Yet as noted above, insofar as there is consumer
confusion about e-cigarettes, it appears to be that a large proportion
of adults (wrongly) believe that e-cigarettes are likely to be as or more
dangerous than tobacco cigarettes, and there is reason to believe that
the FDA’s regulatory approach to e-cigarettes has contributed to the
confusion.
Research on product marketing has shown the consumer
benefits of allowing product manufacturers to make truthful and
non-misleading health-related claims. Where competing producers
can position their products as healthier or less dangerous than their
competitors, they have an incentive to both educate consumers about
the relative health benefits of their products as well as to develop
products about which truthful positive health claims can be made.165
At the same time, consumers tend to draw negative inferences from
the failure to make positive health claims about competing
products. 166 Once cereal producers were allowed to inform
consumers about the potential health benefits of a high-fiber diet,
fiber consumption increased; 167 no less significantly, cereal
producers began to modify their products to increase their fiber

82 Fed. Reg. at 2196.
See J. Howard Beales III, Health Related Claims, the Market for Information and the First
Amendment, 21 HEALTH MATRIX: J. LAW-MED. 7, 8-9 (2011); see also Paul Milgrom, What
the Seller Won’t Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 116
(2008) (“In modern economies, sellers routinely supply helpful information about their
products.”); Pauline Ippolito & Janis Pappalardo, Advertising Nutrition & Health:
Evidence from Food Advertising 1977-1997 (2002); Elise Golan et al., Economics of Food
Labeling, 24 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 117 (2001); John E. Calfee, How Advertising Informs to
Our Benefit, CONSUMERS RESEARCH, (April 1, 1998); J. Howard Beales III et al., The
Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981).
166 See Golan et al., supra note 165, at 128; see also Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios,
The Regulation of Science-Based Claims in Advertising, 13 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 413, 427–28
(1990) (discussing dynamic of “unfolding” product claims in competitive markets).
167 See Beales, supra note 165 at 18-19.
164
165
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content.168 Allowing truthful health claims induced positive changes
in both consumer and producer behavior. 169
The history of cigarette advertising is similarly instructive. 170
When such advertising was less regulated, there was greater
competition among producers to position their products as less
dangerous than their competitors. This further encouraged
producers to investigate and develop potentially less dangerous
product designs and, no less important, increased the salience of the
health risks of smoking. 171 By emphasizing health concerns,
individual firms may have been able to capture greater market share,
but at the cost of a shrinking market. Yet once cigarette companies
were no longer able to make such claims, they had less incentive to
make investments in products that might be less dangerous.
Limiting reduced risk and smoking cessation claims by ecigarette manufacturers and retailers advantages tobacco companies
and limits market positioning of e-cigarettes as an alternative to
tobacco. It also risks misleading consumers, and current smokers in
particular, into believing there are no meaningful health differences
between e-cigarette use and smoking. Limiting truthful product
claims also discourages e-cigarette manufacturers from competing

Id. at 19; see also PAULINE IPPOLITO & ALAN D. MATHIOS, HEALTH CLAIMS IN
ADVERTISING AND LABELING: A STUDY OF THE CEREAL MARKET ix-xx (Fed. Trade
Comm’n Staff Report, 1989); Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Information,
Advertising and Health Choices: A Study of the Cereal Market, 21 RAND J. ECON. 459 (1990).
169 For similar research concerning the market effects of fat claims, see Pauline M.
Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Information and Advertising: The Case of Fat Consumption in
the United States, 85 AMER. ECON. REV. 91 (1995).
170 See Calfee, supra note 165.
171 As Calfee noted, during the “Great Tar Derby” between 1957 and 1959, cigarette
companies made claims about tar then sales-weighted tar and nicotine levels dropped
dramatically. Id. at 41-42. See also Carl A. Sheraga & John E. Calfee, The Industry Effects
of Information and Regulation in the Cigarette Market 1950-1965, 15 J. PUB. POLY &
MARKETING 216 (1996).
168
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with each other on health and safety grounds. Consequently, “[t]he
risk of tragedy from keeping people in the dark is much greater than
the risk of tragedy from informing people,” observes Dr. Lynn
Kozlowski.172
CONCLUSION
The regulation of e-cigarettes as tobacco products, however wellintentioned, threatens to sacrifice harm reduction and significant
opportunities to reduce the tragic health costs of smoking.
Regulation is likely to advantage larger, more established firms,
minimize innovation, and frustrate efforts to help long-term smokers
quit. As Dr. David Abrams warned in the Journal of the American
Medical Association,
Applying overly burdensome, expensive regulatory hurdles
to e-cigarettes could stifle innovation and favor the market
domination of tobacco companies, which potentially
promote dual use of cigarettes and e-cigarettes to minimize
losing market share for their primary cigarette products.
Independent e-cigarette companies are more likely to have
the goal of eliminating combusted cigarettes. 173
The claim here is not that e-cigarettes are harmless or risk-free,
merely that e-cigarettes are less dangerous substitutes for a far more
dangerous product, and that continued innovation and development
of e-cigarette and vaping products could produce substantial
benefits for public health. It is no accident that the most promising
technological alternative emerged from an unregulated

Quoted in Maloney, supra note 146.
David B. Abrams, Promise and Peril of E-Cigarettes: Can Disruptive Technology Make
Cigarettes Obsolete?, 311 J. AMER. MED. ASSN. 135 (2014).
172
173
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environment. The ability of e-cigarette producers to modify and
adjust their products in an effort to identify and satisfy consumer
preferences has helped maximize their potential as a viable smoking
alternative that may help more smokers quit than would have
otherwise.
The world is made safer by dangerous technologies. 174 The
question for public health is not whether e-cigarettes pose risks or
whether those risks are fully understood. The question is whether
regulation of e-cigarettes—regulation that produces market
competition, advantages tobacco companies, reduces innovation,
and silences truthful speech about relative risks—is a net benefit.
Products have risks, but so does product regulation. As with other
precautionary efforts, premature and excessive regulation can do
more harm than good, and, in the case of e-cigarettes, over-cautious
regulation can even kill.
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